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Abstract 23 
 24 
A recent neurobiology study showed that monkeys systematically prefer risky targets in 25 
a visual gambling task. We set a similar experiment with preschool children to assess 26 
their attitudes toward risk and found the children, like the monkeys, to be risk seeking. 27 
This suggests that adult humans are not born risk averse, but become risk averse. Our 28 
experiment also suggests that this behavioral change may be due to learning from 29 
negative experiences in their risky choices. We also showed that though emotional 30 
states and predetermined prenatal testosterone can influence children’s preferences 31 
toward risk, these factors could not override learning experiences. 32 
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1. Introduction 40 
Both people and animals typically avoid choosing the risky option when 41 
confronted with two options of the same mean value but differing in uncertainty (Rode 42 
et al., 1999; Bateson, 2002). The decision to take a particular action depends on 43 
subjective preferences and objective rewards. In axiomatic microeconomic theory, 44 
preferences are represented by utility and an optimal choice is made by maximization of 45 
utility. The utility of a choice with uncertain outcomes is its expected utility, and is 46 
determined by summing the utility of each possible outcome weighted by its probability 47 
(Bernoulli, 1738; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Risk preference implies a 48 
particular shape for the utility function. The inverse relationship between risk and 49 
expected utility should be logarithmic rather than linear (Bernoulli, 1738). This should 50 
be consistent with the fact that a small amount of money means a larger increase in 51 
utility to the poor than to the rich. Thus, the representation of preferences over gambles 52 
by the utility function embodies the property of risk aversion and implies a concave 53 
shape for the function (Jehle and Reny, 2001). 54 
 Several anomalies of the expected utility theory have been well documented in 55 
experimental economics, the most important being the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). As 56 
a result, a number of generalizations have been proposed (Tversky and Kahneman, 57 
1992). The most prominent theoretical alternative is the prospect theory (Kahneman and 58 
Tversky, 1979). This psychological approach posits that what influences risk attitudes is 59 
not the expected outcome of a choice but the distinct reactions to gains and losses; 60 
expected utility theory is right (and people are really risk averse) only for gains. 61 
Cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) updates prospect theory to 62 
consider high- and low probabilities. People are risk averse for gains of high probability 63 
but also for losses of low probability, and are risk seeking for losses of high probability 64 
but also for gains of low probability. Such developments justify why the same person 65 
can show distinct attitudes toward risk, such as insuring a car used to drive to the 66 
casino. The anomalies (Camerer et al., 2005) and prospect theory itself (Trepel et al., 67 
2005) seem to be tuned to the functioning of the brain. 68 
 Not only psychology but also neurobiology can further contribute to our 69 
understanding of decision-making involving risk (Platt and Huettel, 2008). In terms of 70 
the brain processes involved, expected utility theory (and for that matter all rational-71 
choice models of optimization) implicitly assumes that behavior is the result of 72 
decisions that are both controlled and rational, and thus they occur in the cerebral cortex 73 
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(Camerer et al., 2005). However, decisions can also be spontaneous (Schneider and 74 
Shiffrin, 1977; Bargh et al., 1996) and emotional (Zajonc, 1980; Panksepp, 1998; 75 
Damasio, 1995; Davidson and Irwin, 1999; Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Attitudes 76 
toward risk can be controlled and rational but are also automatic and emotional 77 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). The neural basis explaining why the same person can show 78 
both risk-aversion and risk-seeking tendencies depending on the circumstances may be 79 
explained by the fact that controlled-, rational-, automatic-, and emotional brain 80 
processes may either cooperate or compete (Camerer et al., 2005). Immediate fear 81 
responses to risks and fear itself occur in the amygdala (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Brand 82 
et al., 2007). The amygdala also receives inputs from the cortical brain, and both the 83 
amygdala and orbital prefrontal cortex act as part of an integrated neural system guiding 84 
decision-making (Baxter et al., 2000). The amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex are critical 85 
for a variety of food-motivated behaviors in animals (Gallagher, 2000) and humans 86 
(Hamann et al., 1999). The amygdala also plays a role in learning processes that involve 87 
an emotional component, but the prefrontal cortex has the potential to regulate such 88 
affective processes through inhibition of the lateral nucleus of the amygdala. In 89 
particular, the medial prefrontal cortex (infralimbic- and prelimbic cortices) regulates 90 
affective behaviors that are mediated by the basolateral amygdala complex (lateral-, 91 
basal-, and accessory basal nuclei) (Rosenkranz et al., 2003). The medial prefrontal 92 
cortex inhibits conditioned fear by gating impulse transmission from the basolateral 93 
amygdala to the central nucleus of the amygdala (Quirk et al., 2003). The anterior 94 
cingulate cortex is activated in the detection of conflict between rational responses and 95 
effects associated with the emotional amygdala-based system (Botvinick et al., 2001). 96 
The other limbic area of particular interest in our study is the posterior cingulate 97 
cortex, which is also involved in risky decision-making (McCoy and Platt, 2005). The 98 
posterior cingulate cortex translates subjective valuation signals into choice by making 99 
connections with brain areas implicated in processing reward, attention, and action 100 
(Vogt et al., 1992). This area is activated by the likelihood of rewards that are uncertain 101 
in either amount (Smith et al., 2002) or time (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Neurons in 102 
the posterior cingulate cortex physiologically respond to visual stimuli (Dean et al., 103 
2004) after visual-orienting movements (Dean et al., 2004; Olson et al., 1996) and 104 
rewards (McCoy et al., 2003). Thus, the posterior cingulate cortex contributes to 105 
decision-making by evaluating external events and actions with respect to the subjective 106 
psychological state (utility) (Olson et al., 1996; McCoy et al., 2003). 107 
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 Individual neurons in the posterior cingulate cortex of monkeys were shown to 108 
respond according to the riskiness of choice (McCoy and Platt, 2005). In a gambling 109 
task to assess whether neuronal activity in that brain area reflects subjective utility or 110 
objective available rewards, two adult male rhesus macaques were trained to choose 111 
between two options on a computer screen by indicating their choice with an eye 112 
movement. Turning their gaze to a certain target delivered a fixed amount of 150-ms 113 
access to fruit juice as reward. However, the amount of juice available from the other 114 
target was uncertain. Turning their gaze to the risky target resulted in the random receipt 115 
of less than 150 ms in one half of the trials, and more than 150 ms in the other half of 116 
the trials (mean = 150 ms). Thus, choosing the risky target had a 50:50 chance of 117 
receiving a reward larger or smaller than the mean. No other differences between the 118 
targets were involved so that only the riskiness of choice differentiated the two. Risk 119 
was systematically manipulated by changing the difference between the smaller reward 120 
and the larger reward available from the risky target. Both monkeys systematically 121 
preferred the risky target, and the riskier the target, the more likely they were to choose 122 
it. The animals continued to favor the risky option even in a second, less safe 123 
experiment when the probability of obtaining a larger reward from the risky target was 124 
reduced so that the risky choice led to a smaller average reward. The activity of 125 
individual neurons in the posterior cingulate cortex was recorded and was shown to 126 
respond more strongly after making risky choices. More than half of the neurons 127 
signaled not only the choice but also the riskiness of the choice made. Neurons 128 
responding more strongly to the risky target signaled its utility rather than merely the 129 
size of the expected reward, because the responses correlated with preference for the 130 
risky option rather than with the objective value of the option. The utility of the risky 131 
target was greater than the utility of the average reward, and the animals were thus 132 
found to be risk prone. 133 
 We set a similar experiment with preschool children using real fruit juice but, 134 
obviously, we did not record neuronal activity. The experiment was conducted with 100 135 
genetically unrelated Brazilian children (48 little girls and 52 little boys) between the 136 
ages of 4 and 6. The children were offered the choice between a visible quantity of 150 137 
ml of strawberry juice and a random receipt of 0 ml or 300 ml of juice. The experiment 138 
was performed prior to school snack time and repeated after the snack time. It aimed at 139 
tracking possible reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which occurs when a 140 
system (biological or artificial) receives new information and then updates its belief 141 
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about the environment in proportion to its prediction error, and which is obtained from 142 
the difference between the expected- and actual outcomes. The prediction error is then 143 
multiplied by the learning rate to determine the degree by which the action value is 144 
updated. If recent experience is more predictive of the future than distant experience (as 145 
in our experiment) the learning rate should be large. When humans adjust their learning 146 
rate in a Bayesian fashion, the anterior cingulate cortex shows activation (Behrens et al., 147 
2007). 148 
 Deviations from the predictions of axiomatic choice theory can sometimes be 149 
explained by emotion, as proposed by disappointment (Bell, 1985) and regret theory 150 
(Bell, 1982). Thus, our experiment also considered the possible influence of emotions in 151 
children’s decisions. Decision-making can be influenced by emotions through marker 152 
signals that arise in bioregulatory processes (Damasio, 1995; Bechara and Damasio, 153 
2005). Without these signals, people rely only on a reasoned cost-benefit analysis 154 
involving both immediate- and future consequences. Yet rational decision-making 155 
depends on prior accurate emotional processing. An emotional state can be beneficial to 156 
decision-making when it is integral to a task, but it can also be disruptive when 157 
unrelated to the task. One common way to depict emotional states is the affective 158 
circumplex (Watson et al., 1999), where the states are represented in the circular flow: 159 
aroused→excited→happy→calm→quiet→tired→unhappy→fearful→aroused. 160 
We also considered the 2D:4D digit ratio of the children participating in our 161 
experiment. High prenatal testosterone levels, low prenatal estrogens, or both cause low 162 
digit ratios (Manning, 2002). Males tend to have relatively shorter index fingers (2D) if 163 
compared to ring fingers (4D). Thus, males have lower values of the 2D:4D ratio 164 
(~0.98) than females (~1). Both prenatal- (Van Den Bergh and Dewitte, 2006) and 165 
salivary (Apicella et al., 2008) testosterone have been related to risk preferences. Risk 166 
preferences may be partly predetermined if prenatal testosterone plays a decisive role. 167 
 168 
2. Results 169 
2.1 Children’s characteristics 170 
The reason why we decided to perform the experiment with children aged 171 
between 4 and 6 was that they already consider themselves autonomous individuals 172 
separated from their mothers, capable of dealing with quantities and counting, and of 173 
realizing that events may have a cause. In addition, preschool children should have 174 
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relatively less of negative experiences in their past choices involving risk than older 175 
children. 176 
 Schoolteachers freely reported the emotional state of the children during the 177 
experiment, and we translated it in terms of the affective circumplex (Watson et al., 178 
1999) as follows: As for the little boys, 15.38 percent were reported as being aroused, 179 
23.08 percent as happy, 28.85 percent as calm, 15.38 percent as quiet, and 17.31 percent 180 
as fearful. The little girls were reported as happy (18.75 percent), calm (54.17 percent), 181 
quiet (14.58 percent), and fearful (12.5 percent). 182 
As expected (Manning, 2002), boys had an average 2D:4D ratio of 0.973 183 
(standard deviation = 0.015), while girls had an average rate of 0.989 (standard 184 
deviation = 0.015). 185 
 186 
2.2 Experiment 187 
By setting the value 0 to the null hypothesis of risk aversion and the value 1 to 188 
the alternative of risk seeking, we could not accept the null of risk aversion (mean = 0.8 189 
prior to snack time, mean 0.69 after snack time, two-sided t-test < 0.0001, n = 100). 190 
Repetition of the trial after school snack time aimed at tracking reinforcement learning 191 
(as observed). Here we devised a positive learning variable related to the occurrences 192 
where the previous choice of the risky option confirmed one child’s expectation. A 193 
negative learning variable was also conceived to capture the occurrences where the 194 
previous choice of the risky option frustrated a child’s expectation. 195 
We hypothesized that negative learning −?  calls for a change in the previous 196 
risky choice, while positive learning +?  induces repetition of the risky option choice.  197 
We found that negative learning influenced children’s choice of the risky option by 198 
making them more risk averse in the second trial (logistic regression, p < 0.0001, z = 199 
5.8078, n =100). Subjects that experienced negative learning ( ( ) 1P − =? ) were more 200 
likely to abandon the risky option chosen in the first trial than those that did not 201 
experience negative learning ( ( ) 0P − =? ). Children experiencing negative learning had 202 
a 22 percent chance of choosing the risky option in the second trial, while those that did 203 
not experience negative learning had a 95 percent chance of choosing the risky option in 204 
the second trial (Figure 1). 205 
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 206 
Figure 1. Children that had their expectations frustrated in the first choice of a risky 207 
option were less likely to choose the risky option in the second choice. Those 208 
experiencing negative learning ( ( ) 1P − =? ) had a 22 percent chance of choosing the 209 
risky option in the second trial, while those that did not experience negative learning 210 
( ( ) 0P − =? ) had a 95 percent chance of choosing the risky option in the second trial. 211 
 212 
We sought to know whether any of the variables considered were systematically 213 
related to the above behavior of choosing or not choosing the risky option in the second 214 
trial. We found that only 33 percent of the children reported as quiet, q , continued to 215 
choose the risky option again ( ( ) 1P q = ) (p = < 0.0430, z = −2.024, n = 100). Thus, 216 
quiet children were more susceptible to (negative) reinforcement learning and were 217 
more likely to become risk averse in the second trial. Children with any other reported 218 
emotional state ( ( ) 0P q = ) were, in contrast, 62 percent more likely to repeat the choice 219 
of the risky option in the second trial (Figure 2). 220 
 221 
Figure 2. Quiet children ( ( ) 1P q = ) were only 33 percent as likely to repeat the choice of 222 
the risky option in the second trial. In contrast, the others (aroused-, happy-, calm-, and 223 
fearful children) ( ( ) 0P q = ) were 62 percent as likely to choose the risky option again in 224 
the second trial. 225 
 226 
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We also found the 2D:4D ratio to be related to the choices made by the children 227 
in the first trial (p = 0.0151, z = −0.4294, n = 100). Subjects with smaller ratios (higher 228 
prenatal testosterone) were more likely (98.65 percent chance) of being risk seeking in 229 
the first trial. Subjects with a ratio approaching one were found to be only 66.5 percent 230 
as likely of being risk seeking in the first trial (Figure 3). However, the digit ratio was 231 
not statistically significant in the second trial. This interesting finding suggests that 232 
hormones may even have predetermined a subject’s choice but such a condition could 233 
not overcome learning. 234 
 235 
Figure 3. Children with higher prenatal testosterone were more likely to seek risk in the 236 
first trial. Subjects with smaller 2D:4D digit ratios were 98.65 percent as likely of being 237 
risk prone, whereas subjects with a ratio approaching one were found to be only 66.5 238 
percent as likely of being risk prone in the first trial. However, prenatal testosterone did 239 
not matter in the second trial. 240 
 241 
 242 
3. Methods summary 243 
3.1 Questionnaire 244 
The Ethical Committee for Research with Human Beings of the Federal 245 
University of Santa Catarina approved all procedures. Following the Committee’s 246 
instructions, we sent to parents a questionnaire informing them of the detailed 247 
procedures of the experiment and seeking permission for their children to participate. 248 
Children from Florianopolis, Brazil, were sampled from six schools. Of the 212 parents 249 
that we approached, 47 percent consented and so predetermined the total number of 100 250 
subjects who participated in the study. 251 
 The questionnaire asked for the level of education of parents. In the sample, 59 252 
percent of mothers and 52 percent of fathers had a bachelor university degree or above. 253 
The questionnaire also sought information about the mother’s age. Prior to the 254 
experiment, we conjectured that the mother’s age could matter in children’s attitude 255 
toward risk because of the evidence that having a teenage mother roughly doubles a 256 
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child’s propensity to commit crime in the future (Rasanen et al., 1999). However, we 257 
did not find any role for that characteristic in our sample. We also collected information 258 
about children handedness by observing their activities using their hands (mainly for 259 
writing). Approximately 10−13 percent of any population is left-handed, and this 260 
proportion has remained constant over 30 000 years, thus suggesting an evolutionary 261 
role for lefthanders. A number of characteristics have been associated with left-262 
handedness. One of particular interest in our study was that lefthanders seemed to be 263 
predisposed to visual-based thought (Bradgon and Gamon, 2000). Thus, we first 264 
conjectured that in a visual gambling task children’s handedness could play a role. As 265 
expected, 11 percent of the children in the sample were left-handed. However, we did 266 
not find any role for left-handedness in our experiment. 267 
We also asked teachers to describe the children’s emotional state during the 268 
experiment. They returned free descriptions of emotional characteristics, and we 269 
expressed them in terms of the affective circumplex (Watson et al., 1999) (as observed). 270 
As for the children’s fingers, we measured them directly with either a caliper or a rule, 271 
and then calculated the digit ratios. 272 
 273 
3.2 Experiment procedures 274 
Our children’s experiment differed from the monkey experiment in terms of 275 
sample size and composition as well as the number of trials conducted. While the 276 
monkey study employed two individuals and several trials, our experiment considered 277 
100 subjects and only two trials. Since we sought to examine the influence of additional 278 
characteristics such as emotional state, digit ratio, parents’ level of education, mother’s 279 
age, and handedness in children’s risk attitudes, a larger sample was needed to apply our 280 
chosen statistical techniques. As for the number of trials, the monkey study found that 281 
only the last five trials were significant for choice, and that the last trial was the most 282 
important one. Thanks to this finding, and because we expected a high learning rate for 283 
children (as observed), we confined our experiment to two trials. 284 
 In our study, a child participated in the first trial alone, and then left to the 285 
playground without having contact with those still waiting to take part in the 286 
experiment. The teachers told us that children did not communicate with one another 287 
about the experiment because they were more interested in enjoying their snack time 288 
rather than playing with classmates. This ensured that the second-trial choices that took 289 
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place soon after the end of snack time were based on the subjects’ own preferences, and 290 
thus we could rule out imitative behavior. 291 
Two 30-cm2 boxes were placed at two opposite corners of a large table. Prior to 292 
the first trial, children were shown a transparent cylindrical glass (height = 15 cm) half-293 
full with 150 ml of strawberry juice that was placed inside the left-hand side box, and 294 
were told that that box would remain open. They were then shown two glasses, one 295 
empty, and the other filled with 300 ml of juice. Children were explained that only one 296 
of the glasses would appear if they chose the right-hand side box that was kept closed. 297 
Finally, they were told one more time that if they chose the open box they would 298 
certainly receive a half-full glass, and if they chose the closed box they would receive 299 
either an empty glass or a full glass. This reminder was to ensure that the child had 300 
understood the task clearly. Flipping a coin determined whether it was an empty or a 301 
full glass that would be hidden. In the course of the trial, the full glass appeared 53 302 
times and empty glass 47 times. 303 
 304 
3.3 Analysis 305 
We analyzed data using the logistic regression 306 
 307 
1logit log
ij
ijij ij
π
ππ β−= = x                                                                                       (1) 308 
 309 
where 1( ,..., )ij j pjx x=x  is the vector of binary explanatory variables influencing the 310 
risky choice ijπ  over the two trials 1, 2j = . For data from the second trial of the 311 
experiment, we regressed 2iπ  against positive learning +? , negative learning −? , satiety, 312 
and the other remaining information gathered in the questionnaires. We defined 313 
2 2(trial ) 1i Pπ = =  for risk-seeking subjects in the second trial, and 2 2(trial ) 0i Pπ = =  314 
for risk-averse subjects in the second trial. Vector ij =x 0  was defined for positive 315 
learning, females, lefthanders, parents with level of education below university degree, 316 
and quiet children, q ; ij =x 1  for the corresponding opposite variables. Model 317 
estimation and variable selection were run using SAS 9.1. 318 
 Stepwise-, backward-, and forward procedures ensured estimation of a 319 
parsimonious model where −?  was found to be the more relevant explanatory variable. 320 
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From the 22 children that switched preferences (from risk propensity to risk aversion), 321 
18 had negative reinforcement learning. The model estimated then became 322 
 323 
2logit 1.791 3.689 iπ −= − ?                                                                                   (2) 324 
 325 
or 326 
 327 
exp(1.791 3.689 )
2 1 exp(1.791 3.689 )i
π −−−+ −= ??                                                                                             (3) 328 
 329 
From this, we obtained the result that children experiencing negative learning had a 22 330 
percent chance of choosing the risky option in the second trial, while those that did not 331 
experience negative learning had a 95 percent chance (Figure 1). 332 
 To assess if any of the variables could explain the persistence of a choice made 333 
in both trials, we defined 1,2 1,2(trial ) 1i iPπ = =  for the subjects that were risk-prone in 334 
both trials, and 1,2 1,2(trial ) 0i iPπ = =  for those that were risk-averse in at least one trial. 335 
Now only the variable quiet children, q , was selected, and the estimated model was 336 
 337 
1,2logit 0.504 1.198 i qπ = −                                                                                  (4) 338 
 339 
or 340 
 341 
exp(0.504 1.198 )
1,2 1 exp(0.504 1.198 )
q
i qπ −+ −=                                                                                            (5) 342 
 343 
We found 58 children remaining risk-prone in both trials, but quiet children were found 344 
to violate such a behavior. From the model, we obtained the result that quiet children 345 
were only 33 percent as likely to repeat the choice of the risky option in the second trial 346 
(Figure 2). 347 
 We also examined the explanatory variables that exclusively affected risky 348 
choice in the first trial. Here digit ratio d  was the only variable selected, and the 349 
estimated model was 350 
 351 
1logit 45.80656 45.12038 i dπ = −                                                                        (6) 352 
 353 
or 354 
 355 
exp(45.80656 45.12038 )
1 1 exp(45.80656 45.12038 )
d
i dπ −+ −=                                                                                       (7) 356 
 357 
 12
From this, we obtained the result that children with smaller 2D:4D ratios were 98.6 358 
percent as likely to be risk-prone in the first trial, and that this did not occur in the 359 
second trial (Figure 3). However, gender and emotions were also important 360 
characteristics figuring in the choice of the risky option in the first trial because those 361 
variables were correlated with the digit ratio (Table 1). The fact that only the digit ratio 362 
was selected meant that the latter fully incorporated the effects arising from the other 363 
explanatory variables. 364 
Table 1. Correlation between explanatory variables 365 
 366 
 digit ratio boys 
Boys −0.482338  
emotionally aroused children −0.245289 0.263589 
 367 
 368 
4. Discussion 369 
Here we have extended the result of the risk-seeking behavior of monkeys in a 370 
visual gambling task (McCoy and Platt, 2005) to human children. In the study with 371 
monkeys surgical procedures were carried out on the heads of the animals to enable the 372 
use of microelectrode recording techniques to measure activity of individual neurons.  373 
Obviously, such a procedure is inconceivable in experiments on humans. However, we 374 
can still make well-informed deductions about the brain processes involved in our 375 
children’s experiment. As in the monkey experiment, we hypothesized that children’s 376 
posterior cingulate cortex is likely to have been activated in making the choice of the 377 
risky target in both the first- and second trials. The children’s anterior cingulate cortex 378 
may also have been activated by the reinforcement learning occurring between the first 379 
trial and the second. These speculations are left for confirmation in future neuroscience 380 
research. 381 
One implication of our study is that humans do not seem be born risk averse, but 382 
become risk averse. This is in line with previous work suggesting that people’s risk 383 
attitudes may originate in accumulated learning rather than in human traits (March, 384 
1996). Such a hypothesis could be evaluated in our experiment, because it incorporated 385 
a learning ingredient. 386 
Whereas the monkey study relied on training procedures, we were saved that 387 
step in our own experiment because we could properly sample children in their 388 
preschool years. They could be expected to be able to make choices without having 389 
already made many of them in the past. This ensured that the choices they made were 390 
not bounded by too many negative experiences. By repeating the experiment after 391 
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school snack time, we allowed for reinforcement learning to take place at a learning rate 392 
that is arguably large. 393 
 We also sought to assess whether an anthropometric feature such as digit ratio, 394 
which proxies prenatal testosterone, predetermined children’s choices. Digit ratio did 395 
matter in the first trial of the experiment, thus suggesting that hormones may 396 
predetermine a subject’s choice. However, the fact that the digit ratio did not interfere 397 
with the choices made in the second trial suggested, too, that hormones could not 398 
always overcome learning. This deduction is in line with previous findings showing that 399 
inherent traits influence choice but cannot outweigh learning (March, 1996). 400 
 Emotionally quiet children were found to be important in our experiment 401 
because they were more susceptible to the reinforcement learning related to negative 402 
experiences. Only 33 percent of the quiet children found to be risk prone in the first trial 403 
continued to be risk prone in the second. We thus theorize that such an emotional state 404 
is more likely to be overcome by rational brain processes, and favor the behavior where 405 
rationality is more likely to ensue. This conjecture fits the finding that the prefrontal 406 
cortex imposes self-control when spontaneous emotions otherwise would favor self-407 
destructive behavior by recruiting deliberative emotions through directed imagery and 408 
thought (Giner-Sorolla, 2001). 409 
 Risk attitudes evolve (Robson, 1996) and risk preferences may change over the 410 
life cycle. Like children, adolescents are risk prone, and this behavior may be 411 
biologically driven (Steinberg, 2004). Adolescent risky behaviors can have adaptive 412 
benefits in terms of development of independence and survival without parental 413 
protection (Kelley et al., 2004). Adolescent neurodevelopment occurs in brain regions 414 
associated with motivation, impulsivity, and addiction. Here risky behavior is a 415 
transitional trait explained in part by maturational changes in the frontal cortical- and 416 
sub-cortical monoaminergic systems (Chambers et al., 2003). Our children’s experiment 417 
complements these adolescent studies by suggesting that while hard-wired traits such as 418 
hormones may also play a role, humans are not necessarily born risk averse. 419 
 Gender differences matter in risk taking (Byrnes et al., 1999). If anything, girls 420 
are more risk averse. Our results suggested that this is valid for little girls, too. In the 421 
first trial, 25 percent of girls were risk averse as against only 15 percent of boys. This 422 
continued to hold true in the second trial, where 33 percent of girls were risk averse as 423 
against only 29 percent of boys. Also, the seven boys that were described as aroused in 424 
our experiment were risk seeking in both trials. However, we also found that the 425 
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proportion of quiet boys did not differ significantly from that of quiet girls (15.38 and 426 
14.58 percent, respectively). Irrespective of gender, quiet children were less likely to be 427 
risk-prone in the second trial of the experiment. 428 
 The results of the monkey- and children’s experiments must be related to the 429 
previous famous one where patients with prefrontal damage and health subjects 430 
(Bechara et al., 1997) made choices of a sequence of cards from four decks. In that 431 
experiment, both groups learned the payoffs from the previous play. Two decks had 432 
more cards with extreme wins and losses, and thus negative expected value. The other 433 
two decks had less extreme outcomes and positive expected value. After large-loss 434 
cards were encountered, the patients rapidly returned to the high-paying risky decks; as 435 
a result, they went bankrupt more often. But, the patients did not store the pain of 436 
remembered losses as normal subjects did because prefrontal damage disconnects the 437 
cognitive- and affective systems. We deduce that monkeys and children share the same 438 
neural substrate with the patients of that experiment. Monkeys and children possibly 439 
cannot store the pain of remembered losses as adult humans can. Fewer negative 440 
experiences of losses in risky choices may explain this behavior in children. However, 441 
as they accumulate losses, learning plays a role in their choices and thus they become 442 
more risk averse. 443 
 We were cautious about the possible effects of satiety after snack time in the 444 
choices made in the second trial. After all, a child that chose the risk option in the first 445 
trial and was successful in getting a full glass, possibly would not try the risky option 446 
again in the second trial if it were already satiated. The opposite holds true of the 447 
children that got an empty glass after choosing the risky option in the first trial. Thus, 448 
we also considered satiety as another explanatory variable (Section 3.3) only to find that 449 
it had no influence in the choices made in the second trial. 450 
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